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THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL AND

EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
Nurtured by lenient judicial attitudes, local land-use regulations
have spread throughout the country, bringing with them a set of problems of which courts are becoming increasingly aware.' These problems arise when local land-use regulations result in the exclusion from
a particular locality of substantial numbers of people desirous of moving into that locality. Some regulations accomplish this exclusion directly, by limiting the number of residential building permits or water
hook-ups given per year.2 More frequently, exclusionary devices take
the form of minimum lot or building sizes or frontage requirements
which both reduce the3 total number of lots available and raise the cost
of each individual lot.
Local communities argue that the exclusion of potential migrants
assures a low population density, thus avoiding hazards to the physical
and mental health of residents; that it keeps down the need for municipal services, thus avoiding expensive expansions or overuse; and that
it preserves the beauty and comforts of the area. Outsiders assert that
exclusionary zoning abridges their right to share in the health, services
and comforts which residents seek to monopolize for themselves, and
that they have a right "to migrate, resettle, find a new job and start a
new life."'4 Ironically, too much sharing would permit an uncontrolled
population explosion in a locality and produce a blight which would vitiate the advantages for all. There are clearly legitimate interests as1. E.g., DeSimone v. Greater Englewood Housing Corp. No. 1, 56 N.J. 428, 267
A.2d 31 (1970); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,
119 NJ. Super. 164, 290 A.2d 465 (1972); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of
Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11, 283 A.2d 353 (1971); Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.,

439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970);
National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 410 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); cases cited note
26 infra.
2. E.g., Goleta Valley Water Dist., Santa Barbara County, Ordinance 72-2 (Dec.
7, 1972); see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F Supp. 574 (N.D.
Cal. 1974); Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972).
3. Other devices include the exclusion of multiple dwellings or mobile homes and
restrictions on the number of bedrooms within multiple dwellings. Logically, all zonng devices which elevate the cost of settlement or limit the quantitative or even qualitative opportunities for settlement have an exclusionary effect to some degree. See note
41 infra.
4. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
[849]
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serted by both sides, and the decision-maker should weigh and accommodate them as fairly as possible.
Where ordinances are challenged as exclusionary, courts have
shown a willingness to utilize a more demanding standard of review
than that traditionally accorded challenges to local land-use regulations.' However, a sound constitutional basis for these challenges and
a definitive statement of the more exacting standard they inspire has
not emerged. This note argues that the right to travel and settle provides a standard of review well suited to meet the problems posed by
exclusionary zoning laws. The derivation, historical treatment and recent judicial application of the right to travel indicate that when a law
interferes with free travel, a court will balance the degree of interference against the importance of the governmental objective served by
the law. If courts were to adopt this balancing test to determine the
validity of exclusionary zoning laws, they would be able to protect the
legitimate goals of land-use regulation while protecting the rights of potential migrants.
Judicial Review of Local Land-Use Regulations
Traditionally, land owners have challenged land-use regulations
on the basis of the constitutional right to use one's property freely.
Normally, courts have struck down only those regulations shown to be
arbitrary or unreasonable. In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
the Supreme Court approved a comprehensive zoning ordinance and
established the principle that the owner's objections would fail unless
he could show that the ordinance was not rationally related to any of
a broad range of police power objectives. The owner's burden of proof
in overcoming this presumption of constitutionality is a heavy one.7
Traditional judicial deference to zoning authorities arises in large
part from the courts' inability to formulate competent judgments of the
5.

See cases cited note 1 supra.

6.

272 U.S. 365 (1926).

Ambler recognized the difficulty of judicial evaluation

of zoning ordinances at a relatively early stage in their development.

They have since

become even more complex and judicial incompetence looms correspondingly larger.
This problem was noted in Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 376-77, 285 N.E.2d
291, 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 150-51 (1972). 'The evolution of more sophisticated efforts to contend with the increasing complexities of urban and suburban growth has been

met by a corresponding reluctance upon the part of the judiciary to substitute its judgment

. . .

for the considered deliberations of its progenitors . .

.

. Implicit in such a

philosophy of judicial self-restraint is the growing awareness that matters of land use
and development are peculiarly within the expertise of students of city and suburban
planning, and thus well within the legislative prerogative, not lightly to be impeded."
7. See generally 5 & 6 R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PRoPERTY, pt. V (1971);
Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HASTINGS L.J.

135 (1963).
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"wisdom, necessity and validity" 8 of complex zoning ordinances.
Where the constitutional decision turns on a mass of technological or
sociological data, the institutional limitations of courts to deal with these
"legislative facts" makes greater judicial restraint a necessity.' This
attitude pervades the courts' treatment of economic and social regulations and is equally applicable to zoning laws. 10 The problem is even
more acute when an ordinance is challenged by outsiders on the ground
that their right to settle in an area has been abridged, rather than by
owners claiming a deprivation of property rights. Challenges by own-

ers usually entail limited considerations of the application of a zoning
ordinance to a particular parcel of land, while challenges by outsiders
ultimately relate to broad patterns of land-use restraint."1

Judicial

conflicting evidence in the latter case becomes a truly
evaluation of the 12
monumental task.
If one could rely upon the initial decision-makers to attempt to accommodate fairly the competitive interests of residents and potential
migrants, then the judicial deference traditionally shown to zoning decisions challenged by landowners would be appropriate in the context
of challenges by outsiders. However, this is not the case and the partiality of local zoning decisions, the politically impotent status of the
minority group affected, and the undemocratic nature of the decision8. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
9. "The limitations of the adversary process and the specialization of courts
evoke serious doubts as to judicial competence in deciding the proper regional allocation
of land resources." Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use Planning, 105 U. PA.
L. REv. 515, 530 (1957).
10. Dean v. Gadsden Times Publ. Corp., 412 U.S. 543 (1973); Ferguson v.
Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955);
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 424-25 (1952); AFL v. American
Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538, 542 (1949) (concurring opinion); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the
Supreme Court: An Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 SUPREmE Cr.Ruv. 34 (1962).
11. Cf. Sager, Exclusionary Zoning: ConstitutionalLimitations On The Power Of
MunicipalitiesTo Restrict The Use Of Land, 1972 LAND-UsE CONTROLS ANN. 153, 16576.
12. While courts may formulate rules of thumb such as requiring that every municipality provide at least one multiple dwelling zone or that minimum lot sizes larger
than one acre are per se unconstitutional, such holdings have little effect on exclusionary
practices since other methods may be employed to circumvent them. Compare Appeal
of Girsh, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), with Appeal of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc.,
439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970). In addition such rules of thumb ignore the numerous situational variants which bear on the actual effect of an ordinance on the opportunities for settlement. All facets of a zoning scheme must be considered in addition
to all facets of the particular environment to arrive at meaningful judgments regarding
the exclusionary nature of a particular ordinance. Bosselman, Can The Town Of Ramapo Pass A Law To Bind The Rights Of The Whole World?, 1 FLA. STATE U.L. REV.
234, 255 (1973); Williams & Norman, Exclusionary Land-Use Controls, The Case of
North-EasternNew Tersey, 22 SYRAcusE L. REv. 475, 498-502 (1971).
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making process serve to differentiate challenges by landowners from
those by outsiders and call for increased judicial intervention in the latter situation.
While courts are hesitant to interfere with the legislative process
when decisions turn on complex data, they are more willing to do so
when decision making authorities cannot be relied upon to have accommodated competing interests in an unbiased manner. 13 The structure
of zoning mechanisms in this country is not geared toward an unbiased
balancing of the interests of outsiders with those of residents. State
enabling acts vest zoning authority at the local level so that decisions
are made by local officials who are responsive only to the demands of
residents and who find it politically expedient to ignore the interests
of outsiders.1 4 Since residents increasingly demand the exclusion of
all or certain groups of potential settlers, the emerging pattern is one
of widespread locational segregation and loss of housing opportunities.") To counteract the partiality of zoning authorities and the drastic
effects of exclusionary zoning laws on the rights of migrants, increased
judicial review of zoning decisions is essential.' 6
It is unrealistic to expect that migrants will be able to defend their
own interests and to counteract the partiality of zoning boards through
13. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (apportionment of legislature);
Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (school desegregation).
14. The problem is widespread and increasing. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING
OFFICIALS, PROBLEMS OF ZONING AND LAND USE REGULATIONS (1968); C. BERGER, LAND
OWNERSHIP AND USE: CASES, STATUTES AND OTHER MATERIALS, 685-90 (1968); Heyman, Legal Assaults on Land Use Regulations, 5 URBAN LAWYER 1, 1-7 (1973); REPORT
The
OF U.S. PRESIENr's COMM. ON URBAN HOUSING, A DECENT HOME 140 (1969).
American Law Institute has proposed increased state planning and state review of local
decisions to combat excessive parochialism. MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE, arts. 78 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1971); see Babcock, Comments on the Model Land Development
Code, 1972 URBAN LAW ANN. 59; sources cited note 21 infra.
15. "We are rapidly becoming several Americas . . . a country historically divided
not only by race and by levels of income, but more recently a nation rent by the results
of these forces as they are seen in patterns of locational segregation and loss of housing
opportunities." Scott, Exclusionary Land Use Practices, in AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF
The problem has been
PLANNERS, PLANNING CONFERENCE, SOCIAL ISSUES 1 (1973).
Aloi, Goldberg & White, Racial and Economic Segregation by
widely discussed.
Zoning: Death Knell for the Home Rule?, 1969 U. TOL. L. REv. 65; Haar, Wayne
Township, Zoning for Whom? In Brief Reply, 67 HARV. L. RRV. 986 (1954); Haar,
Zoning for Minimum Standards: The Wayne Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1051
(1953); Hagman, Urban Planning and Development-Race and Poverty-Past, Present,
and Future, 1971 UTAH L. REv. 46; Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning,
Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969); Symposium-Exclusionary Zoning, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 465 (1971) (see bibliography therein at 627);
Note, Snob Zoning: Developments in Massachusetts and New Jersey, 7 HARv. J. LEGIS.
246 (1970).
16. See generally M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND
JUDICIAL REVIEW 34-44 (1966).
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political processes without the aid of increased judicial protection. A
lack of organization and group identification inheres in the status of
future migrants. 7 Moreover, outsiders have no voice in the immediate
zoning decisions since state enabling acts vest this authority in local
bodies responsive only to residents.' 8 The well-defined interests of
communities passing exclusionary measures and their political strength
reduces to the purely theoretical the political recourse which migrants
have to state and national legislatures.' 9
Since it is the grave shortcomings of municipal authorities as decisionmakers in zoning cases which calls for increased judicial intervention, it would seem that greater deference is appropriate when the

decision is made by the state or by one of the new regional land use

authorities. 20 These authorities can more confidently be relied upon
to weigh competing interests in the entire region and to arrive at an
unbiased decision. A flexible standard of review based upon -the status
of the initial decisionmaker might encourage states to vest the authority
to regulate land use in state or regional bodies when decisions involve

constituencies broader than merely local residents-a result much
hoped for by planning authorities. 2 '

Thus, although this note argues

that a balancing test is appropriate, this should be understood to apply
only to local land-use regulations. Traditional presumptions of validity

might still be accorded the decisions of regional land use authorities.
The Constitutional Basis of Increased Judicial Review
Legal attacks on exclusionary zoning have been brought under the
17. Thus, as a group, future migrants conform to the model of "discrete and insular minorities" to whom special judicial solicitude has been recognized as appropriate.
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
18. Migrants thus constitute a group victimized by "legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation. . . ." Id.
19. See Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 81 YALE L.J. 61, 63-64 n.14 (1971), indicating the hostile position
of the Nixon administration to "forced integration" of the suburbs.
20. For example, the San Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission and the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.
21. Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 1966 WAsH. U.LQ. 1 (1966); Haar, Regionalism and Realism in Land-Use
Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 535-36 (1957); Note, Regional Impact of Zoning:
A Suggested Approach, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1251 (1966); Note, Zoning: Looking BeCourts themselves have
yond Municipal Borders, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 107 (1965).
called for regional planning to extricate them from the dilemma of exclusionary zoning.
See, e.g., Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138
(1972): "Of course, these problems cannot be solved by Ramapo or any single municipality, but depend on the accommodation of widely disparate interests for their ultimate
resolution. To that end, statewide or regional control of planning would insure that interests broader than that of the municipality underlie various land use policies." Id. at
376, 285 N.E.2d at 300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
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equal protection and due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Supreme Court has developed a two tier approach
to adjudication under these clauses. 1-2 Where a suspect class, such as
a racial minority, or a fundamental interest, such as the vote, is
affected, the Court casts a virtually impossible burden of proof upon
the government to show both that the law is necessary to the promotion
of a compelling state interest and that no less drastic means of achieving the governmental objective is available.2 3 Where neither a suspect
class nor a fundamental interest is involved, the Court applies a much
less stringent test: the party challenging the law bears the burden of
showing that it is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental
objective. Few laws are likely to stand under the strict scrutiny standard of review while few are likely to fall under the rational relation
test. Thus, in order to mount a successful attack on exclusionary zoning under the two tier approach, ,the challenger must convince the court
that it should adopt the strict standard of review by showing that the
ordinance affects a suspect class or a fundamental right. Courts have
struck down zoning laws found to be racially discriminatory, but this
rationale is of limited application.2"
22. See generally, Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37
L. RV. 341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L
Rav. 1065 (1969).
23. Only one case has been sustained under this standard. Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24. A number of courts have found that zoning ordinances established racial
classifications and have therefore utilized the strict standard of equal protection review
to invalidate the ordinances. A classic case is Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886). See also Kennedy Park Homes Ass'n v. City of Lackawanna, 436 F.2d 108
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1010 (1971); Dailey v. City of Lawton, 425 F.2d
1037 (10th Cir. 1970); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union City,
424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970); Crow v. Brown, 332 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ga. 1971), affd,
457 F.2d 788 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Sisters of Providence v. City of Evanston,
335 F. Supp. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1971). While the presence of racial discrimination is a
strong foundation for an equal protection challenge, it has limited application to exclusionary zoning techniques. It is both difficult to show a discriminatory motive on the
part of local zoning authorities and unclear how far courts will inquire into motivation.
Compare Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), with Griffin v. School Bd., 377
U.S. 218 (1964), and Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
In the vast majority of exclusionary ordinances, such motivation is either lacking or subsumed under the broader head of discrimination through exclusion of the poor. It is
unlikely that courts will often utilize strict scrutiny on the basis of the discriminatory
exclusion of racial minorities when this is only incidental to the exclusion of the poor.
It might be maintained that exclusion of the poor and exclusion of minorities are the
same. However, there are twice as many poor whites as poor blacks. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1973, Table no. 548, at
335. The argument would have to rest on an exclusionary effect proportionally greater
for blacks. This, however, would apply to all wealth-related classifications since a
CALIF.
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A broader basis for attacks on exclusionary zoning would seem
to be the claim that such ordinances violate the equal protection clause
by impeding the interest of the poor in adequate housing, thus creating
a wealth-related classification. 25 Although commentators have advocated an extension of strict scrutiny to wealth-related classifications and
to those affecting the interest in housing, the Supreme Court has never
held that legislative classifications which affect only the poor are constitutionally suspect in and of themselves.26 In fact, the Burger Court
has rejected the opportunity to do so in several recent cases."
Thus
while many zoning ordinances prohibit low-income housing or raise the
costs of settlement to such an extent that the poor are totally priced
out of the community, the claim that such laws create a classification
based on wealth is unlikely to invoke the strict standard of review.
The contention that exclusionary zoning ordinances require strict
review because they affect a fundamental interest in housing is also
likely to fail. In Lindsey v. Normet2 s the Court rejected the contention
that decent housing is a fundamental interest and refused to apply strict
scrutiny to Oregon's unlawful detainer law. Justice White wrote for
the Court:
rT]he Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document
any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular
quality. . . . Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships
are legislative, not judicial, functions.2 9
greater proportion of blacks are below the poverty level than are whites. It would thus
require strict judicial review of all wealth-related classifications, a result apparently rejected by the Supreme Court. See text accompanying note 27 infra.
25.

Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the

Indigent, 21 STAN. L. Rv. 767 (1969); Note, Low Income Housing and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 343 (1971); Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equal

Protection, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, Zoning: Closing the Economic Gap,
43 TEMPLE L.Q. 347 (1970); Note, The Equal Protection Clause and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge,81 YALE L.J 61 (1971).

26. E.g., San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
There are cases containing dicta to the effect that wealth-related classifications invoke
strict review, but these cases involved "fundamental" rights which would themselves invoke strict review regardless of the classification. McDonald v. Board of Election
Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969) (right to vote); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966) (right to vote).
27. Memorial Hospital v. County of Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (residency
requirement for welfare medical aid); id. at 270 (Douglas, J., concurring in separate
opinion); San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973) (school
financing system); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (referendum required for
construction of low rent housing projects); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970)
(ceiling on welfare payments).
28. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).

29, 1d, at 74,
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Equally unlikely to trigger strict review is a factual situation which
both classifies according to wealth and impedes the interest in subsistence. In Dandridge v. Williams,3" the Court applied the minimum
rationality standard in upholding a statute setting a ceiling on welfare
benefits without regard to the size of the family. Citing a number of
cases involving state regulation of businesses in support of its use of
the minimum rationality standard, the Court said: "We recognize the
dramatically real factual difference between the cited cases and this
one, but we can find no basis for applying a different constitutional
standard."'"
These cases indicate that the Court is concerned with limiting the
situations in which it utilizes the stricter standard of review. While the
Warren Court was concerned with the inception and expansion of these
situations, the Burger Court has rejected the implications of this process
and refused "to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of
guaranteeing equal protection of the laws." 3" This position is based
on doubts about the proper role of the courts and the institution of judicial review. An activist approach to equal protection, in which the
Court declares certain fights fundamental and certain classifications
suspect and demands compelling reasons for laws affecting them, involves the judiciary in delicate value judgments largely unguided by the
text or history of the Constitution.33 In the absence of limiting rationales, this branch of equal protection review could involve the courts
in endless interventions in the legislative process.3" Since the Court
is an undemocratic institution, neither elected nor responsive to any
constituency, such an aggressive judicial role may be criticized as a
counter-majoritarian force in an otherwise representative democracy.3 5
It appears that the Burger Court has not found neutral constitutional
principles to justify the expansions of equal protection review urged
upon it3" and, rather than sit as a "superlegislature," has refused to ex30. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
31. Id. at 485.
32. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973).
33. For a criticism of this judicial role, see L. HAND ,THE BILL OF RIGHTS 7072 (Atheneum ed. 1964).
34. In Shapiro v. Thompson, Justice Harlan referred to the doctrine of fundamental interests invoking strict review as "an exception which threatens to swallow the
standard equal protection rule. Virtually every state statute affects important rights."
394 U.S. 618, 661 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
35. See L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 70-72 (Atheneum ed. 1964); A. BICKEL,
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 23
(1962); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1124-27,
1131-32 (1969).
36. E.g., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through The Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REV. 7 (1969).
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tend strict scrutiny to cover such classifications and interests as wealth
and housing.
While the Burger Court has stopped the evolutionary expansion

in the scope of situations in which strict review is utilized, it has continued to support the right to travel and settle "as a right of constituThe right to travel and settle has substantial
tional significance." 3

constitutional underpinnings as well as a long history of judicial recognition.38 As a result, cases involving this right do "not require an ad
hoc determination as to the social or economic importance of that
right"; 9 instead the Court can distinguish the right to settle from other
important interests such as education in that the former is "explicity

or implicity guaranteed by the Constitution." 0

Perhaps the central reason that commentators and lower courts
hesitate to attack exclusionary zoning measures on the basis of the right
to settle has been the fear that such a theory, if held to apply at all,
would automatically require the showing of compelling need for virtually

all planning law; since all such laws control, direct, or limit the natural
opportunities for settlement within a locality.41 One comentator has
argued that:
Were a court to . . . hold that an inferred right of any group to
live wherever it chooses might not be abridged without some compelling state interest, the law of zoning would be literally turned
upside down: presumptions of validity would become presumptions of invalidity and traditional police powers of a state would
by new and vague notions of substantive
be severely circumscribed
42
equal protection.
37. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32 (1973).
38. See text accompanying notes 48-87 infra.
39. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 32 (1973).
40. Id. at 33-34.
41. "It is the nature of all land use and development regulations to circumscribe
the course of growth within a particular town or district and to that extent such restrictions invariably impede the forces of natural growth." Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.
2d 359, 377, 285 N.E.2d 291, 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, 151 (1972). A decision based
on the right to travel "would presumably preclude any arrangements which would set
quantitative limits on the more intensive housing to be provided in any community."
Williams, Doughty & Potter, The Strategy on Exclusionary Zoning: Towards What Rationale and What Remedy?, 1972 LAND-UsE CoNTRoLs ANN. 177, 196 (1972). For an
argument that application of the right to travel should demand a showing of a compelling need for zoning laws, and that "few local land use regulations are likely to survive
in their present form," see Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional
Standard for Local Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. Cm. L. Rav. 612 (1972); and Comment, The Right to Travel-Its Protection and Application Under the Constitution, 40
U.M.K.C.L. REv. 66 (1971).
42. Comment, Zoning, Communes and Equal Protection, 1973 URBAN L. ANN.
319, 324. A recent decision by a federal district court in California invalidated a
growth control ordinance passed by the City of Petaluma and the reasoning may lend
support to the fear that the right to travel would turn adjudications regarding zoning
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This fear is a product of the Supreme Court's two tier approach to cases
arising under the equal protection and due process clauses.4 3 This
note argues that although every interference with travel and settlement
does not demand strict review, courts often test such interferences by
a more demanding standard than minimum rationality. In the context
of exclusionary zoning laws, this approach would avoid the all or nothing rigidities of the two tier approach to equal protection and due process analysis. It would allow courts through a cautious process of judicial intervention to balance with each other the legitimate interests of
residents and migrants and to adjust the inequities resulting from the
present system of local zoning.
The Derivation and Application of the Right to Travel
The right to travel has a long history of constitutional recognition.
Although the particular source of the right is undecided, all the sources
historically proposed lead to the conclusion that a balancing test is appropriate for interferences with travel. This section examines the constitutional underpinnings of the right to travel, the goals it was designed
to achieve, and its application by the Courts in order to demonstrate
that a balancing of competing interests is the only test consistent with
the historical development of the right.
The Articles of Confederation
The Articles of Confederation expressly protected travel.
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the
free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people
of each state shall have free ingress and egress to and from any
other state, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and
commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions
as the inhabitants thereof respectively . . .44
The drafters of article IV of the Constitution deleted the right to
travel, apparently without discussion, in an early draft of the article,
even though they retained the privileges and immunities clause in section 2 of that article. In view of the fact that the object of the Philadelphia Convention was to "form a more perfect Union, ' 45 courts and
laws upside down. Although the decision purports to preserve traditional methods of
zoning such as maximum density levels, it is unclear why these should escape the strict
scrutiny analysis imposed by the court on Petaluma's ordinance. The court's order has
been stayed by Justice Douglas, pending appeal. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974), stay granted, July 15, 1974.
43. See text accompanying notes 22-23 supra.
44. Articles of Confederation art. IV.
45. U.S. CONST. preamble,
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commentators have concluded that the drafters assumed the right to
travel would be protected elsewhere in the Constitution without need
of further mention in article IV."
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the Constitution
The first judicial statement of the right to travel was made by Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell.47 Perhaps due to the proximity
of the right of "free ingress and egress" to the privileges and immunities clause in the Articles of Confederation, Justice Washington listed
the right as among the privileges and immunities safeguarded by article
IV, section 2 of the Constitution. However, the Supreme Court determined at an early stage that the privileges and immunities clause
guarded only against discrimination by one state against citizens of
other states.48 Since the privileges and immunities clause does not
guarantee any substantive rights but only protects against discrimination, it would pose no challenge to a state statute which interfered
equally with the travel of citizens and noncitizens of the state.
Though courts have used -the privileges and immunities clause to
invalidate burdens on travel which discriminate against citizens of states
other than the enacting state,4 9 the clause is not an absolute protection from such state discrimination.
[The clause] does not preclude disparity of treatment in the many
situations where there are perfectly valid independent reasons for
it. Thus the inquiry in each case must be concerned with whether
such reasons do exist and whether the degree of discrimination
bears a close relation to them.50
Thus article IV, section 2 is subject to a balancing of the interests of
noncitizens against the state's purposes, the legitimacy of these purposes, and the degree to which they justify special burdens on noncitizens. To the extent that the right to travel has its source in this clause,
the appropriate test of laws interfering with it would balance the interference against the governmental objectives allegedly served.
The Commerce Clause
Courts have frequently alluded to the commerce clause 51 of the
46. Z. C-AFEE, THREE HuMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTrTnON OF 1787, 184-87
(1956); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966).
47. 6 F. Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
48. "It was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens
of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned." Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S.

(8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
49.
50.
dison v.
51.

Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (emphasis added); accord, AdAddison, 62 Cal. 2d 558, 399 P.2d 894, 43 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1965).
"The Congress shall have Power ... to regulate Commerce..
among the

sever'1 tAte.

, ,

" IJ.S, CQNST. art. I, § 8,
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Constitution as a basis for the right to travel.5 2 Though in terms a
grant of power to Congress to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the Supreme Court early assumed that the clause imposed implicit limits on the states' power to legislate even in the absence of congressional preemption.53 The states could not unreasonably burden
areas of commerce which were of national concern or which demanded
a uniform system of regulation. 54 Since courts consider the movement
of persons across state lines to be a type of interstate commerce,5 5 they
have recognized a right to travel free of state-imposed burdens subject
only to national regulation and to the implicit constraints recognized
by courts in the absence of such regulation.
The Supreme Court espoused this position in Edwards v. California,"0 strikng down a California statute which made it a crime to aid
in bringing an indigent into the state. The character of the right to
travel as recognized in Edwards illuminates the scope and purposes historically attributed to the right. The court held that the statute legislated in an area requiring uniform national regulation and thereby
created an unreasonable barrier to interstate commerce. The rationale
for this holding was that the Constitution "was framed upon the theory
that the peoples of the several States must sink or swim together, and
that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.''57 The right to travel, like the commerce clause itself,58 was seen
as a means of promoting national solidarity. Thus the attempt of one
state to isolate itself from the problems of others contravened this purpose and was the gist of the violation.
Where a significant national interest in commerce is jeopardized
by a state law, courts balance the state and national interests to achieve
a proper accommodation.5 9 This balancing of interests in the light of
52. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404,
445 (1935) (Stone, Brandeis, Cardozo, JJ., dissenting); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 418, 432 (1870) (dissenting opinion); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.)
35, 49 (1867) (concurring opinion).
53. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
54. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851).

55. Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (applying the Mann Act to consensual prostitution); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917); cf. Helson &
Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245, 251 (1929).

56. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
57. Id. at 174, citing Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
58.

See text accompanying notes 67-74 infra.

59. "[Slome enactments may be found to be plainly within and others plainly
without state power. But between these extremes lies the infinite variety of cases, in
which regulation of local matters may also operate as a regulation of commerce, in
which reconciliation of the conflicting claims of state and national power is to be attained only by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands of the state

and national interests involved."

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768-
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"all the circumstances of the case" has been the prevailing approach
for at least 135 years6" of adjudication under the commerce clause. 6
Insofar as the commerce clause provides a basis for the right to travel,
the applicable test of state interference with the right would apparently
incorporate the balancing of local and national interests in accord with
accepted principles of commerce clause adjudication.
The Structure and Relationship Inherent in the Federal Union
In Crandall v. Nevada,"' the Supreme Court struck down a one
dollar tax levied on stage and railroad companies for every passenger
they carried out of the state on the grounds that the tax violated the
right to travel. The Court eschewed reliance on any particular provision of the Constitution and based the right to travel on notions of the
structure and relationships inherent in the concept of a national union.
The Court reasoned that the powers of the federal government could
be realized only through its lawfully appointed agents, and that it was
necessary to the execution of these powers that the government be able
to summon citizens to its various offices. The citizen had a correlative
right to come to the seat of the federal government or any of its secondary offices to serve or to assert claims, to transact business with it, or
to participate in any of its functions. The right to travel therefore necessarily belonged to each citizen if he was to carry on these relations
with the federal government.
The Court in Crandall did not establish a right to travel merely
for purposes relevant to a citizen's relation with the federal government. The right to travel was also said to protect the relation of the
states and their citizens to other states and their citizens. After offering the first rationale, the Court quoted Chief Justice Taney's dissent
in the PassengerCases6 3 in support of the broader purpose of the right
to travel:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was
formed, we are one people, with one common country. We are
all citizens of the United States; and, as members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through64 every part
of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.
Implicit in this view is the notion that the commerce clause and
69 (1945); see Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); cf. California
v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733 (1949). Compare Southern Ry. Co. v. King, 217 U.S. 524
(1910), with Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. Blackwell, 244 U.S. 310 (1917).
60. Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
61. See generally F. FRANKFuRTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE (1937).
62. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
63. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 464 (1849) (Taney, J., dissenting).
64. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849), quoted in Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S.
(6 Wall.) 35, 48-49 (1867); accord,Ex parte Archy, 9 Cal. 147 (1858).
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the privileges and immunities clause, as well as various other clauses,6 5
are not the exclusive bases of the right to travel but are merely evidence of its character and of the framers' intent that it should exist.
The commerce clause was designed to federalize foreign and interstate
commerce where necessary in order to further common economic intertests and to avoid "rival, conflicting, and angry regulations."6 6 The privileges and immunities clause, in order to accomplish much the same
objectives as the commerce clause, protected the citizens of each state
against discrimination while in another state.6 7 Indeed an overriding
objective of the framers was to "form a more perfect Union" and "insure domestic tranquility." 68
Against this background, Chief Justice Taney's statement of the
right to travel as a premise implicit in the Union is both sensible and
well founded. National regulation to further interstate commerce
would mean little if merchants were not allowed free ingress and egress
by other states. The right to enjoy all the privileges and immunities
of citizens of a neighboring state would be equally meaningless if one
could be denied entrance. Perhaps more important, domestic peace and
harmony-social, economic and political--depend to a great extent on
free interstate travel. 9 In -the absence of such a right, rivalry and isolationism producing "discord and mutual irritation" could well become
a problem of great magnitude. 70
65. Other provisions, such as the prohibition on imposts or duties on imports or
exports laid by the states, U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl.2, and the prohibition of peace-

time armies maintained by the states, id. cl.3, were also designed to further the economic and political harmony of the new Union.
66. 3 M. FARRAND, REcoRDs OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, 547 (1911) (quoting
Madison). The objectives of the commerce clause are well described in H.P. Hood &
Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935). See also Stem, The Scope of the Phrase Interstate Commerce, 41 A.B.A.J. 823
(1955).
67.

In Paul v. Virginia, the Court said of the privileges and immunities clause:

"It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to
constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this ....
"Indeed, without some provision of the kind removing from the citizens of each
State the disabilities of alienage in the other States, and giving them equality of privilege with citizens of those States, the Republic would have constituted little more tflan
a league of States; it would not have constituted the Union which now exists." 75 U.S.
(8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868) (citation omitted).
68. U.S. CONST. preamble.

69. A basic reason for judicial review of state court decisions is the fact that
"[t]he constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we not inquire) that
state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and state interests, might sometimes
obstruct, or control, or be supposed to obstruct or control, the regular administration of
justice." Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816).
70. Local exclusionary zoning ordinances produce the same social, economic and
political discord which the right to travel was derived to guard against. NAT'L COMM'N
AGAINST DISCRIMINATION IN HOUSING, THE IMPACT OF HOUSING ON JOB OPPORTUNITIES
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A further indication that the structure and relationship of the federal union is the source of the right to travel is the fact that courts have
tied the right to the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the Slaughter-House Cases,7 1 the Supreme Court
held that the privileges and immunities protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment did not encompass the civil rights formerly left to the protection of the states, but instead included only those rights "which owed
their existence to the Federal government, its National character, its
Constitution, or its laws."172 Citing Crandall, the Court referred to the
73
right to travel as among those rights which were national in character.
Several other cases have reiterated the idea that the right to travel is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment's privileges and immunities
clause. 74 Since only rights arising by virtue of national citizenship are
protected by this clause, the inclusion of the right to travel in its protections can be seen both as an express recognition that the structure and
relationship of the federal union is the source of the right, and as an
affirmation of the essential character of the right to travel as one designed to further the goals of national unity.7 5
If the nature of the union is the source of the right to travel, then
courts should test any state interference with that right by balancing
the national interest in free travel against the state interest served by
the interference. Only in this way may the court properly determine
whether the burden on the right to travel is justified. Adjudications
under both the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities
clause have historically employed such a balancing test, and the right
to travel, springing from the same sources and directed at much the
same purposes, should be subjected to a similar form of analysis.
The validity of this approach was recognized in New York v.
O'Neill.7 The statute in question provided for the forwarding of witnesses, after procedural due process requirements were met, to criminal
proceedings-in another state having the same statute.7 7 The appellant
21 passim (1968); A. SCHORR, SLUMS

AND SOCAL INSEcurrT
OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DisoRDERs (1968).

61-66 (1964); REPORT

71. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
72. Id. at 79.
73. Id.
74. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177, 181 (1941) (Douglas and Jackson,
JJ., concurring in separate opinions); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 429-30 (1935);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
75. Holding that the right to travel is protected by privileges and immunities
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would not answer any questions about its scope
or the degree of permissible interference, since litigation under the clause is sparse and
standards have not been developed. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 443 (1935)
(Stone, J., dissenting).
76. 359 U.S. 1 (1959).
77. A Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Within or Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, §§ 942.01-.06, [1973] Fla. Stat. 178-87.
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argued that the statute embodied a compulsion to travel interstate and
therefore violated his rights. Justice Frankfurter dismissed this claim
saying that the statute involved only "a temporary interference with voluntary travel."78 Furthermore, the right to travel was designed to prevent the "Balkanization of the Nation, '79 and the statute "conduces
• . . toward a free-willed collaboration of independent States. 80 In
O'Neill the interference with free travel was slight while the state interest in informed and fair criminal trials was important. The law advanced goals of national unity rather than erecting obstacles to them,
and the need for a strong justification for the interference with travel
was consequently less.
In Williams v. Fears,8 1 the Supreme Court upheld a special tax
on "emigrant agents," persons hiring laborers to be employed outside
the state. In answer to a claim that the tax violated the right to travel
the Court said: "If it can be said to affect the freedom of egress from
the State . . . it is only incidentally and remotely. The individual laborer is left free to come and go at pleasure . . . while those whose
business it is to induce persons . . . to change their location . . . are
subjected to taxation in respect of their business as other citizens
are. "82 The Court found that this remote burden on interstate travel
was outweighed by the state's legitimate police power objectives. The
slightness of the interference with travel, the lack of discrimination
against citizens of other states," and the legitimate ends pursued by
the state weighed in favor of upholding the law.
Williams and O'Neill demonstrate the balancing test appropriate
to a structural rationale for the right to travel. Whether the right arises
directly from the commerce or privileges and immunities clauses, or
is implicit in the structure of the union, the promotion of national solidarity has been recognized as the essential purpose. Thus every interference with an individual's -travel has not been held to abridge the constitutional right. Instead a substantial interference which outweighs
any governmental objectives is required. In the context of exclusionary zoning ordinances, such an approach would require more than
merely showing that the ordinance impeded the interest in free travel
of one individual plaintiff. Instead, plaintiffs would have to show a
serious interference with migratory patterns involving substantial numbers of settlers. 8" The court would then weigh this interference with
78.

359 U.S. 1, 7 (1959).

79. Id. at 8.
80. Id.
81. 179 U.S. 270 (1900).
82. Id. at 274-75.
83.
84.

Ci. Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870).
See note 12 supra & note 112 infra.
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the objectives sought to be attained by the ordinance8 5 The objective
of this balancing test would be to see that each locality absorbs its fair

share of the regional housing demand. Through a regional allocation
of housing needs, courts would promote national solidarity by instigating cooperation among separate localities. Thus the application of a
balancing test to exclusionary zoning ordinances would directly advance
the basic goals for which the right to travel was developed.
The Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
More recently the right to travel has been considered a dimension

of the liberty guaranteed by the due process and equal protection

clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."6 Tins position alters the focus of the protection afforded travel. While the structural

and relational rationales protect the individual as a member of a national union, the due process and equal protection clauses protect the
individual as an individual.8 7 It has been argued that a shift from the

structural basis for the right to travel to one based on individual liberty
radically alters the degree of protection afforded travel.8 s This seotion
argues that recent cases dealing with travel under the due process and

equal protection clauses have not protected the right to travel, in the
absence of other interests, as a fundamental personal right.

Thus the

degree of protection afforded travel has not been drastically increased.
Courts may still test interferences with travel by a balance of competing interests and may avoid the rigors of strict scrutiny and compelling

state interests.
85. Id.
86. U.S. CoNs'r. amends. V, XIV. Clearly, the right to travel does not have its
historical source m the Fourteenth Amendment since the amendment was not adopted
until 1869. The right to travel was recognized in dictum several times before this, and
the holding m Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867), was squarely based
on it. See text accompanying notes 62-64 supra. Additionally, the right to travel receives strong support from the argument that it was expressed m the Articles of Confederation and was assumed to continue in effect under the Constitution. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra.
87. Various sources may be cited in support of the historical importance of free
travel as an individual liberty. Z. CiAmnn, Tinina HuMA RMGHTs iN Tm CoNsTrrUTIoN
or 1787 162-213 (1956); e.g. A. DEToQJvEiLLE, DEMoCRACY iN AMERiCA 284-85 (Doubleday-Anchor ed. 1969); F TuRNER, TrE FRONTIER IN AmcA N HISTORY 237
(1920). On the other hand, one could point to the numerous laws restricting travel.
These date back to Boston's ordinance in 1636 limiting settlement by poor persons and
also form part of our historical traditions. C. BRiDENBAUGH, CrrmEs iN Tm WDERNss
79, 231 (1955).
88. Comment, The Right to Travel: Another Constitutional Standard for Local
Land Use Regulations?, 39 U. CH!. L. REv. 612 (1972).
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The Passport Cases
The Supreme Court took the position that travel is an element of
the liberty constitutionally guaranteed to the individual for the first time
in a series of three cases dealing with passport restrictions on international travel. In Kent v. Dulles89 the Court held that the Secretary of
State was not statutorily authorized to withhold passports for membership in the Communist party. The opinion contained dictum stating
that "the right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen
cannot be deprived without due process of law . ...
90 Since the
holding was based on a statutory construction which eliminated any infringement of travel, it was not necessary -to "decide the extent to which
it can be curtailed."9 1
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State92 members of registered Communist groups were denied passports, and application therefor was
made a crime by the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950.93 The
Court stated that the denial of passports constituted a severe restriction
of travel as it effectively prohibited travel anywhere outside the western
hemisphere by members of Communist organizations, and that it violated the right to travel as included in the Fifth Amendment guarantee
of liberty. The Court cited a number of First Amendment cases and
used the strict standard of review in finding that the government had
failed to show the required compelling justification for the law. The
fact that the class whose travel was restricted was defined by its political
associations, thus raising a potential issue under the First Amendment,
may have triggered the Court's use of strict scrutiny. The Court's reliance on the right to travel may have flowed from its reluctance to confront the issue of the associational rights of members of the Communist
94

party.

In Zemel v. Rusk,95 decided only a year after Aptheker, the Court
applied a considerably less stringent standard of review. The Court
held that the State Department's 1969 passport ban on travel to Cuba
did not violate the right to travel as included in the Fifth Amendment.
The law did not single out certain political groups and, thus, no associ89.

357 U.S. 116 (1958).

90. Id. at 125.
91. Id. at 127.
92. 378 U.S. 500 (1964).
93. 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1951).
94. Accord, Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957), where the
Court made covert use of a stricter standard of review to protect defendant's interest
in practicing law. Defendant was excluded from the bar for, inter alia, membership in
the Communist party. Since the individual's interest in pursuing a profession does not
normally invoke such strict review, the crucial factor, as in Aptheker, may have been
defendant's First Amendment associational rights.

95.

381 U.S. 1 (1965).
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ational rights existed. Additionally, Cuba was the only area in the
western hemisphere restricted and "the weightiest considerations of national security"9 6 were said to support the law. The Court used a balancing test, adjusting the weight of the justification demanded of the
government to the gravity of the interference with travel and the status
of the class whose travel was impaired. Zemel effectively neutralized
any misconceptions which Aptheker may have created regarding the
need for a compelling justification for every interference with travel.
The Penalty Analysis
The Supreme Court, in three recent cases, struck down statutes
which imposed a penalty on the exercise of the right to travel. In 1969
the Court held unconstitutional state one year residence requirements
for welfare aid. Shapiro v. Thompson" held that the residency
requirements violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, wfien imposed by a state and the due process clause of
the Fifth Amendment, when imposed by CongressY8 Shapiro did not
involve a direct prohibition of travel as in Aptheker and Zemel but
rather a temporary denial of a governmental benefit to migrants. This
indirect impediment constituted a "penalty" on the exercise of the
"fundamental" right to travel. The Court tested this penalty by the
strict standard of review and demanded that the classification be
"shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.",9
In holding that the residency requirements penalized the exercise
of the right to travel, the Court dwelt on the nature of the penalty,
emphasizing the plight of the indigent migrant completely deprived of
welfare "during his first year of residence, when his need may be most
acute." 00 That the law affected only poor people, that these poor
people were recent migrants, and that they were deprived of their principal source of subsistence for the period of a year, were the additional
considerations which made the impediment to travel so serious as to
96. Id. at 14. Clearly these considerations would not constitute a compelling governmental interest, had one been demanded. The Court did not demand that the government's claims be substantiated, nor confine its inquiry to the facts on the record, nor
consider alternatives less drastically infringing on plaintiff's rights. This method of
analysis indicates the Court's rejection of strict review. Note, Travel and the First
Amendment, Zemel v. Rusk, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 470 (1965).
97. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
98. The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the federal government, but
"discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process" under the Fifth
Amendment, which addresses itself to congressional action. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S.
497, 499 (1954).
99. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.$. 618, 634 (1969).
109. Id. qt 629,
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invoke strict review. 01 A small burden on travel which affected both
rich and poor alike would doubtless have invoked a more deferential
standard of review. 10 2 Thus, although the Court spoke of the "fundamental" right to travel, its preoccupation with the nature of the penalty
indicates that all restrictions on travel may not require strict review.
Dunn v. Blumstein'0 3 held that a one year residency requirement
for voting in state elections constituted a penalty on the exercise of the
right to settle and, thus, required a compelling justification by the state.
Since the vote is a right which is "of the essence of a democratic society,"'10 4 the interference with travel caused by forcing migrants to
"choose between travel and the basic right to vote" was as serious as
that caused by the denial of welfare to indigent migrants in Shapiro.
As in Shapiro, the Court in Dunn looked to the severity of the penalty
placed on travel and adjusted its standard of review accordingly.
In Vlandis v. Kline0 5 the Court struck down a Connecticut law
which conditioned eligibility for in-state university tuition rates on prior
state citizenship. Students not qualifying at the outset of their education were permanently classified "nonresident." The Court found that
this classification created a conclusive presumption violative of due process. The Court did not mention the right to travel despite the obvious
similarity to Shapiro. This omission may signal the Court's reluctance
to apply right to travel analysis when the interest at stake is education
rather than subsistence, even when a permanent nonresident classification is involved.
The Vlandis Court stated that its decision should not "be
construed to deny a State the right to impose on a student, as one element in demonstrating bona fide residence, a reasonable durational
residency requirement, which can be met while in student status."'10 6
Later, in Starns v. Malkerson,'0 7 the Court affirmed a lower court's
approval of a one year residency requirement for in-state tuition. The
residency requirement for education, unlike that for welfare, applied
both to rich and poor students. In addition, the interest in education,
while important, may be thought somewhat less crucial than the "necessities of life" of which migrants were deprived in Shapiro. 0 8 Thus,
101.

After Shapiro itwas even suggested that these factors alone would trigger

strict review of laws affecting them.

Note, Shapiro v. Thompson: Travel, Welfare and

the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U.L. Rv.989 (1969).
102. Cf. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v.Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707
(1972).
103.

405 U.S. 330 (1972).

104.

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964).

105. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
106. Id. at 452.
107. 401 U.S. 985 (1971), aff'g 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970).

108.

"While we fully recognize the value of higher education, we cannot equate its
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although travel and settlement were "penalized" in both situations, the
holdings in Starns and Vlandis indicate that where the "penalty" imposed on settlers affects less crucial interests, or burdens them less severely, and where the class affected does not consist solely of the poor,
justifications somewhat less than compelling may pass muster.
The Court acknowledged the validity of this approach in MemorialHospital v. County of Maricopa,10 9 in which it held that a one year
residency requirement for county medical aid to indigents abridged the
right to settle. The Court said:
Whatever the ultimate parameters of the Shapiro penalty analysis,
it is at least clear that medical care is as much "a basic necessity
of life" to an indigent as welfare assistance. And, governmental
privileges or benefits necessary to basic sustenance have often
been viewed as being of greater constitutional significance than less
essential forms of governmental entitlements.

Accordingly, the classification created by the residence
requirement,.., unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling [state] interest, is unconstitutional.' 1 0
Balancing in the Context of Exclusionary Zoning
Two recent cases which dealt with exclusionary zoning laws found
the courts rejecting the standard of strict review and reaching results
consistent with the balancing test advocated in this note. In Village
of Belle Terre v. Boraas4 ' the Supreme Court sustained a zoning
ordinance restricting land use to single family dwellings or to occupancy
by not more than two unrelated persons, which the plaintiffs had alleged to violate their rights of privacy, association, and travel. Both
the majority and Justice Marshall, in his dissent, agreed that density
requirements and ordinances seeking to control or limit growth were
constitutionally sound. The Court thus continued to reject implications
which might have been drawn from cases such as Shapiro or Dunn that
any interference with settlement requires strict scrutiny.
Insofar as the right to settle is concerned, the result in Belle Terre
is consistent with a test balancing the interests of residents with those
attainment wiih food, clothing and shelter. Shapiro involved the immediate and pressing
need for preservation of life and health of persons unable to live without public assistance, and their dependent children." Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273 Cal. App. 2d 430,
440, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260, 266-67 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554 (1970).
109. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
110. Id. at 259, 262 (footnotes omitted). The Court distinguished Starns and
Vlandis saying "reference to the tuition cases is instructive. The lower courts have contrasted in-state tuition with 'necessities of life' in a way that would clearly include medical care in the latter category." Id. at 260 n.15, citing Kirk v. Board of Regents, 273
Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969).

111.

94 S. Ct. 1536 (1974).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

of potential migrants. The assumption may be made that the degree
to which any zoning ordinance impedes settlement within municipal
boundaries is a product of the pressures for settlement in the region.
Where the population is small and the pressures for growth minimal,
even an ordinance severely limiting population density levels may have
little effect on migratory patterns. Lower courts evaluating zoning ordinances have recognized the importance of this factor in determining
the validity of such ordinances." 2
The village of Belle Terre consisted of 700 residents in approximately 220 homes. There was no evidence of substantial regional population pressures suggesting that the village was a natural area for expansion; nor was the ordinance aimed at exclusion of the poor by restriction of low income housing. 113 Instead, the ordinance was in part
justified as a means of lowering rental values by restricting the incomes
on which landlords drew to those of one or two rather than several tenants. In short, Belle Terre's interference with free settlement was trifling, and the deference shown to the town's asserted goals can be justified in this light.
The discussion of the second case involving exclusionary zoning
laws will be facilitated by a brief mention of another right to travel case.
In Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines". the
112. See County Comm'rs v. Miles, 246 Md. 355, 228 A.2d 450 (1967), where the
court upheld a five acre minimum lot size, noting that Queen Anne's County had the
third smallest population of any political subdivision in the state and that population
growth had proceeded at a very slow pace in the past. Should these conditions change,
the "five acre limitation as applied to the County's river frontage may prove too restrictive." Id. at 373, 228 A.2d at 459; Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 264 n.3,
181 A.2d 129, 146 n.3 (1962) (Hall, J., dissenting). In attacking an exclusionary zoning ordinance, Judge Hall said, "I do not mean to urge by what I have said or am about
to say that every sparsely populated township cannot zone to maintain, reasonably, present basic rural land uses, at least until growth reaches it. Many such areas are so far
away from the metropolitan center and suburbs that any substantial change will not
come or be threatened for many years. I speak only of those municipalities where substantial growth has begun or is so practically imminent that it cannot validly be held
off by local legislative walls denominated as zoning." Id. See also Appeal of Girsh,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970), where the court invalidated a prohibition of multiple dwellings in Nether Providence, a town located 12 miles from downtown Philadelphia and well connected by commuter transportation: "[I]f Nether Providence is a
logical place for development to take place, it should not be heard to say that it will
not bear its rightful part of the burden." Id. at 245, 263 A.2d at 398-99. See generally Washburn, Apartments in the Suburbs: In re Appeal of Joseph Girsh, 74 DICK. L.
R v. 634 (1970).
113. Contrast the situation in Molino v. Mayor Council, 116 N.J. Super. 195, 281
A.2d 401 (1971), where the court struck down the borough's apartment bedroom limitations and requirements for a large number of amenities such as swimming pools and tennis courts. These requirements in effect allowed only high rental apartments and in
view of the need for low and middle income housing were invalid,
114. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).

January 1975]

EXCLUSIONARY ZONING

respondents challenged a one dollar "use and service charge" levied
by the Airport Authority for each enplaning passenger. The funds
were to be used for airport maintenance and improvement.' 15 Citing
Shapiro, the Supreme Court said:
The principle that burdens on the right to travel are constitutional
only if shown to be necessary to promote a compelling state interest has no application in this contest. . . . The facility provided
at public expense aids rather than hinders the right to travel.:"
The Court's distinction of Shapiro is not as facile as the language might

suggest and has broad ramifications for the standard of review utilized
in other right to travel cases. Many such laws may lay claim to the

enhancement of travel. 1 7 Land-use regulations seeking to plan and
provide for a decent environment have strong claims to the enhancement of settlement." 8 Paradoxically they may seek this goal by limiting the number of persons allowed to settle in the area. Given such
a situation, whether the ordinance aids rather than hinders travel can
only be determined by balancing the exclusionary effect with the municipality's claims that an enhanced environment would result, in which
settlement may better take place. In Evansville, the hindrance to
115. The Court thus distinguished Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35
(1867), where there was no showing that the fee charged was used for the provision
of services which furthered travel. Justice Douglas dissented stating that the decision
in effect overruled Crandall. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707, 722 (1972).
116. Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines, 405 U.S. 707,
714 (1972).
117. The residency requirements in Shapiro could also be said to "aid rather than
hinder" the right to travel, though perhaps not so immediately as airport facilities.
Chief Justice Warren, dissenting in Shapiro, argued that states seeking to raise welfare
aid might be intimidated by apprehensions of large numbers of migrants in search of
greater benefits. Thus, "residence requirements allowed each State to concentrate its resources upon new and increased programs of rehabilitation ultimately resulting in an enhanced flow of commerce as the economic condition of welfare recipients progressively
improved.... And Congress could have also determined that residence requirements
fostered personal mobility. An individual no longer dependent upon welfare would be
presented with an unfettered range of choices so that a decision to migrate could be
made without regard to considerations of possible economic dislocation." Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 651 (1969) (Wauren, C.J., dissenting). If the distinction between Chief Justice Warren's dissenting argument in Shapiro and the majority opinion
in Evansville is the immediacy of the "aid" to travel, then one is presented with the
difficult question of when the enhancement of travel is sufficiently immediate to render
the hindrance nugatory. Compare this to the opinion in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S.
330 (1972), stating that one year voter residence requirements presented a clear burden
on travel with only the most remote claims, such as insuring an informed and fraudfree electorate, to enhancement of settlement.
118. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1954): Miserable conditions may
"suffocate the spirit by reducing the people who live there to the status of cattle. ...
They may also be an ugly sore, a blight on the community which robs it of charm,
which makes it a place from which men turn."
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travel posed by a one dollar charge was negligible while well maintained airports substantially aided travel. The Court's refusal to apply
the Shapiro strict scrutiny analysis indicates its willingness to balance
the competing interests involved when an ordinance is challenged on
the basis of the right to travel. The "aids rather than hinders" formula
is particularly applicable to a balancing of the competing considerations
involved in land-use regulations, where potential migrants and the municipality may have equally strong positions relative to the enhancement of settlement.
The New York Court of Appeals took this perspective in Golden
v. Planning Board..9 (Ramapo) in upholding the town of Ramapo's
amendments to its zoning ordinance. Pursuant to extensive studies,
Ramapo amended its ordinance to require special permits for residential building. The ordinance required that sufficient schools, parks,
firehouses, roads, sewers, and drainage facilities be available before the
planning board would issue special permits for residential construction.12 ° Regarding the right of "free mobility," the Court stated:
What segregates permissible from impermissible restrictions [on the
right to travel], depends in the final analysis upon the purpose of
the restrictions and their impact in terms of both the community
and general public interest ....
What we will not countenance, then, under any guise, is community efforts at immunization or exclusion. But, far from being
exclusionary, the present amendments merely seek, by the implementation of sequential development and timed growth, to provide
a balanced cohesive community dedicated to the efficient utilization of land ....
• . . Considered as a whole, it represents both in its inception
and implementation a reasonable attempt to provide for the sequential, orderly development of land in conjunction with the needs
of the community . . . while simultaneously obviating the blighted aftermath which
the initial failure to provide needed facilities
2
so often brings.' '
This approach, similar to that taken in Evansville, results in a balancing
of the severity of the restrictions on travel with the municipalities' need
for such restrictions. This balance is the objective index by which a
court may determine whether there exists a purpose to exclude in the
words of the Ramapo court, or a hindrance rather than an aid, in the
words of the Evansville court.
119.
120.
121.

30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
Id. at 368, 285 N.E.2d at 295, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 143-44.
Id. at 378, 380, 285 N.E.2d at 302-03, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152-53.
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Conclusion - The Right to Travel Provides a Meaningfd
Standard for Attacks on Exclusionary Zoning
There is need for increased judicial review of local land-use regulations which exclude substantial numbers of persons from the locality.
The courts, however, lack expertise in evaluating the mass of facts necessary to an informed decision. Thus judicial intervention should be
cautious, weighing all the circumstances in each case to arnve at a fair
accommodation of the legitimate goals of zoning laws and the interests
of potential nigrants. 22
The right to travel derives essentially from constitutional considerations of the structure and relationships inherent in the federal union
and is ained at preserving and strengthening this umon.' 23 Like other
rights thus derived, the right to travel has historically been subject to
where the court weighs the competing claims of state
a balancing12 test,
4
and settler.

Recent cases have expanded the rationale for the right to travel
to include concepts of individual liberty for their own sake rather than
merely to further goals of national unity.' 25 Cases developing this rationale have, however, stopped short of declaring that any interference
with travel and settlement requires strict scrutiny In the passport
cases, the Court demonstrated a willingness to balance the degree of
interference with travel against governmental interests, at least where
no First Amendment rights of association lurked in the background. 26
In Shapiro v. Thompson and subsequent residency requirement cases,
it was not travel alone which invoked strict review, but the additional
important interests jeopardized by the penalty on travel. The validity
of this interpretation of Shapiro is strengthened by the fact that, in
Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport Authority v. Delta Airlines,'27 the

Court dismissed the strict scrutiny mode of analysis and found that the
ordinance aided rather than hindered travel. Nevertheless, to arrive
at this determination, the court implicitly balanced the individuals' interests in travel against the need of the locality to maintain an airport
facility, which actually enhanced individuals' ability to travel. Tins approach is applicable -to the vast majority of right to travel cases. Similarly, in those cases involving land use regulations, a balance of the
competing claims of government and migrants is required. It is relatively immaterial whether this balance is phrased in terms of an indi122. See text accompanying
123. See text accompanying
124. See text accompanying
125. See text accompanying
126. See text accompanying
127. 405 U.S. 707 (1972).

notes
notes
notes
notes
notes

8-12 supra.
62-75 supra.
75-83 supra.
84-110 supra.
89-96 supra.
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vidual's right to settle versus a municipality's interest in a livable environment or in terms of the hindrance to free settlement caused by
the law versus the enhancement of orderly settlement provided by the
law.
Thus both the historical derivation and application of the right and
its modern expansion indicate that infringements on the right to travel
may escape the rigidities of the courts' two tier equal protection analysis, and that courts may balance the competing interests involved on
a case by case basis. Should courts adopt such a test, doubts concerning the use of the right to travel as a constitutional basis for attacks
on exclusionary zoning' 28 would largely disappear. Thus understood,
the right to travel and settle provides a constitutional standard well
adapted to the problems of mitigating the parochialism of local zoning
ordinances, protecting the rights of potential settlers, and preserving
the legitimate goals of zoning laws.
Thomas Steel*
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